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Let a consumer consume two goods, and let good 1 be a Giffen good. Then a well-
known necessary condition for such behaviour is that good 1 is an inferior good. This 
paper shows that an additional necessary for such behaviour is that good 1 is a 
gross substitute for good 2, and that good 2 is a gross complement to good 1 
(strong asymmetric gross substitutability). It is argued that identifying asymmetric 
gross substitutability as an additional necessary condition gives better insight into 
Giffen behaviour, both on an analytical level and an intuitive level. In particular, the 
paper uses the concept of asymmetric gross substitutability to give a taxonomy of 
preferences, which includes preferences that are locally characterised by Giffen 
behaviour, and also uses this concept to introduce new decompositions of the effect 
of a change in own price on the demand for a good, different from those known in 
the literature. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Any paper that treats Giffen behaviour may be confronted with the criticism: to what extent 
is such behaviour relevant? While there is empirical evidence for Giffen behaviour (Battalio 
et al., 1991; Jensen and Miller, 2008), one may still argue that the law of demand is violated 
only infrequently. Yet, the point of Giffen behaviour is that it is a tool to get insight into what 
determines the price elasticity of demand. The fact that the income effect may exceed the 
substitution effect helps remind us that these two determining effects may not operate in the 
same direction. Also, even if one accepts Giffen goods do not occur very frequently, there still 
remains a class of goods that are very similar to Giffen goods, in that their price elasticity of 
demand is negative but very small, or is even zero. Getting insight into the extreme possibility 
of Giffen goods also gives us insight into these similar goods, which in this reasoning are 
important as they occur more frequently. 
In Section 2, we derive a list of necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for Giffen 
behaviour. This includes well-known necessary conditions such as non-homothetic 
preferences, and the fact that the Giffen good must also be an inferior good while the other 
good consumed is a luxury (strong asymmetric income elasticity), which we refer to as strong 
asymmetric income elasticity. To these well-known conditions, we add the necessary 
conditions of weak asymmetric gross substitutability, where the cross-price effects on the two 
goods are unequal, and of strong asymmetric gross substitutability (De Jaegher, 2009), where 
good 1 is a gross substitute for good 2, while good 2 is a gross complement to good 1. 
In Section 3, we show the relations between all these necessary conditions, and show that 
the set of preferences characterised by Giffen behaviour lies in the intersection of the set of 
preferences characterised by strong asymmetric income elasticity, and the set of preferences 
characterised by strong asymmetric gross substitutability. Moreover, it is shown that a strict 
focus on strong asymmetric income elasticity may cause us to include preferences that do not 
approach Giffen behaviour. While a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour on good 1 is 
that good 1 is an inferior good and good 2 a luxury, this is not a sufficient condition. Indeed, 
when good 1 is an inferior good and good 2 a luxury, it may be that good 1 is price elastic and 
good 2 is price inelastic, which is the opposite of what we need for Giffen behaviour. 
Section 4 given an intuition for why the latter may occur. In particular, this may occur when 
low-quality goods are considered as candidate Giffen goods. We argue that such low-quality 
goods, while being inferior goods, may at the same time be price elastic, and more so than the 
other good consumed, making them bad examples of Giffen goods. Instead, it is argued that a 
good example of a Giffen good is a high-quality good, in the sense that we must have a good 
that is able to serve multiple functions if necessary. 
Consider for instance a consumer who consumes only rice and meat. If the consumer’s 
purchasing power is low, rice is able to perform both the function of providing the consumer 
with subsistence and with taste, and are in this sense a high-quality good. Potatoes are a gross 
substitute for meat, precisely because they can very well take over the role of subsistence 
from meat. Because meat has a substitute, it is price elastic. At the same time, meat is a gross 
complement to rice, because it complements rice in making food more tasty, but may not be 
able to perform well as an alternative source for subsistence. Because rice does not have a 
substitute, it is price inelastic. This intuition also applies when the other good consumed is a 
composite good consisting of all other goods rather than meat, where this composite 
commodity may be considered as giving flavour to life. 
Section 5 treats alternative decompositions of the own-price effect to the well-known 
Hicksian (and Slutsky) decomposition. These well-known decompositions are founded in the 
necessary condition for Giffen behaviour of strong asymmetric income elasticity. Given the 
stress that we have put on strong asymmetric gross substitutability as an additional necessary   2
condition, we treat alternative decompositions that are founded in this concept. We end with 
some conclusions in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Derivation of necessary conditions 
 
In this section, we treat several well-known necessary conditions for Giffen behaviour, and 
introduce some new necessary conditions. We focus on the case where two goods are 
consumed, and where good 1 is the potential Giffen good. The analysis is easily extended to 
multiple good when good 2 is thought of as a composite good.
1 In the context of this book, it 
is important to not that we will not always make all underlying assumptions explicit. E.g., 
when we apply the Slutsky equation, we simply assume that the conditions necessary for the 
application of this equation are valid. 
The necessary conditions we derive all boil down to some form of asymmetry in the effect 
of income and price changes on the consumption of the two goods. The necessary conditions 
are ordered from weak necessary conditions to stronger ones. Section 2.1 shows that good 1 
should be a necessity, and good 2 a luxury. Section 2.2 shows that good 1 should be a 
relatively better substitute for good 2 than good 2 is for good 1. Section 2.3 repeats the well-
known necessary condition that good 1 should not only be a necessity but should also be an 
inferior good. Section 2.4 shows that good 1 should be a gross substitute for good 2, while 
good 2 should be a gross complement to good 1 (strong asymmetric gross substitutability). 
Section 2.5. finally shows that good 1 should be price inelastic, while good 2 should be price 
elastic (strong asymmetric price elasticity). 
 
 
2.1. Unequal income elasticities: weak asymmetric income elasticity 
 
A necessity (luxury) is defined as good i for which the income elasticity, denoted  m xi ε , is 
smaller (larger) than one:  1 < m xi ε  (1 > m xi ε ). Define as weak asymmetric income elasticity the 
case where one good is a necessity, and the other good is a luxury. 
 
Definition 1. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterized by weak asymmetric income 
elasticity if it is locally the case that  1
1 < m x ε  and  1
2 > m x ε . 
 
This leads us to the following proposition. 
 
 
Proposition 1. A necessary condition for good 1 to be locally a Giffen good (i.e. locally 
0 ) / ( 1 1 > ∂ ∂ p x ) is that preferences are locally characterised by weak asymmetric income 
elasticity, where locally good 1 is a necessity and good 2 a luxury. 
Proof: 
As is well-known, the Hicksian decomposition of the own price-derivatives in a substitution 
effect and an income effect takes the form 
 
                                                 
1 Specifically, by Hicks’ Composite Commodity Theorem (for a proof, see Carter, 1995), all other goods than 
good 1 can be treated as a composite good as long as the relative prices of all these other goods do not change. A 
change in the price of good 2 is then interpreted as a price change that leaves the relative prices of all other 









































2  (2) 
 
where hi denotes the compensated Hicksian demand for good i. As  0 / 1 1 < ∂ ∂ p h , it follows that 
a necessary condition for good 1 to be a Giffen good is that  0 / 1 < ∂ ∂ m x , meaning that a 
necessary condition is that  1
1 < m x ε , or good 1 is a necessity. 
Furthermore, by the Engel aggregation identity, we have 
 
1
2 1 2 1 = + m x m x s s ε ε , (3) 
 
where  m x p s i i i / ) ( =  is the share of the budget that the consumer spends on good i. By budget 
balancedness,  1 2 1 = + s s . It follows from this that if good 1 is a necessity ( 1
1 < m x ε ), good 2 
must be a luxury ( 1
2 > m x ε ). QED 
 
Another way to state Proposition 1 is that a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour is that 
the consumer has non-homothetic preferences. Concretely, homothetic utility functions have 
what we can refer to as strong symmetric income elasticity (1
2 1 = = m x m x ε ε ), a property which  
by Proposition 1 should not apply under Giffen behaviour. 
 
Corollary 1. A necessary condition for good 1 to be locally a Giffen good is that the 
consumer locally has non-homothetic preferences. 
Proof: 
We show that local homothetic preferences imply income elasticities that are locally all 
equal to 1. Take a bundle  ) , ( 2 1 x x , and derive from this a bundle  ) , ( 2 1 tx tx , for  1 > t . By the 
fact that indifference curves are blown-up versions from one another, the marginal rate of 
substitution at bundles  ) , ( 2 1 x x  and  ) , ( 2 1 tx tx  is the same. This means that, when income is 
increased by a factor t, consumption of each good increases by a factor t. In other words, 
income elasticity is equal to 1 for both goods. The fact that local homothetic preferences 
implies unit income elasticities can be restates as saying that non-unit income elasticities (= 
weak asymmetric income elasticity) implies non-homothetic preferences. Since by 
Proposition 1, Giffen behaviour implies weak asymmetric income elasticity, and weak 
asymmetric income elasticity implies non-homothetic preferences, it follows that local non-
homothetic preferences are a necessary condition for local Giffen behaviour. QED 
 
As shown in Figure 1a, for any given indifference curve, we can find a corresponding 
homothetic indifference map by “blowing up” the given indifference curve u0. We then have 
linear income expansion paths, denoted by the dashed lines. Non-homothetic preferences, 
where good 1 is a necessity (and possibly an inferior good) and good 2 is a luxury are now 
obtained by making the blown up versions of the given indifference curve flatter, as illustrated 
in Figure 1b. We then obtain convex income expansion paths. Graphically, a necessary 
condition for Giffen behaviour is that higher indifference curves tilt as in Figure 1b. In Figure 
1b, good 1 is a necessity, but not an inferior good, as the income expansion paths do not have 




Figure 1 Homothetic and non-homothetic preferences 
 
 
2.2. Inferior good/luxury: strong asymmetric income elasticity 
 
By the analysis in Section 2.1, we can be more precise about the necessary condition 
referring to income elasticity. Define good i as an inferior good when  0 < m xi ε . We can then 
additionally introduce the concept of strong asymmetric income elasticity. 
 
Definition 2. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterized by strong asymmetric income 
elasticity  if locally one good is an inferior good ( 0
1 < m x ε ) and the other good a luxury 
(1
2 > m x ε ). 
 
A well-known result then allows us to formulate the necessary conditions for Giffen 
behaviour sharper: 
 
Proposition 2. A necessary condition for good 1 to be locally a Giffen good is that 
preferences are locally characterised by strong asymmetric income elasticity, where locally 
good 1 is an inferior good and good 2 a luxury. 
Proof: See the proof of Proposition 1, which not only shows the weaker statement of 
Proposition 1, but also the stronger statement of the current proposition. 
 
 
2.3. Unequal gross cross-price effects: weak asymmetric gross substitutability 
 
Section 2.1 shows that a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour is weak asymmetric 
income elasticity, meaning that we have non-homothetic preferences. We here show that this 
asymmetry can be expressed in another form, in the sense that a necessary condition for 
Giffen behaviour is that goods are asymmetrically gross substitutable. The expression 
) / ( j i p x ∂ ∂  (with  j i ≠ ) may be seen as measuring the extent to which good i is a gross 
substitute for  ) 0 / ( > ∂ ∂ j i p x  or gross complement to  ) 0 / ( < ∂ ∂ j i p x  good j. (A)symmetric 
gross substitutability compares this measure across goods. We start by showing that with 
homothetic preferences, goods are what we call strongly symmetrically gross substitutable, 








(a) (b)   5
Definition 3. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterized by strong symmetric gross 
substitutability if  ) / ( ) / ( 1 2 2 1 p x p x ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ . 
  
This leads us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. The consumer locally has homothetic preferences over goods 1 and 2 
(1
2 1 = = m x m x ε ε ) if and only if it is locally true that  ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 1 2 p x p x ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ .  









































2  (5) 
 
As is well-known, given the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, the Hicksian cross-price effects 
are equal, or  ) / ( ) / ( 1 2 2 1 p h p h ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ . Combining (4) and (5), we see that 
) / ( ) / ( 2 1 1 2 p x p x ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ m x m x 2 1 ε ε = ⇔ . QED 
 
The fact that local homothetic preferences are equivalent to strong symmetric gross 
substitutability  is illustrated in Figure 2. In Figure 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c), homothetic preferences 
are each time obtained by constructing blown-up versions of the indifference curve in bold. 
For a bundle 1 on the bold indifference curve, we construct a line crossing the origin and 
bundle 1. On every bundle 2 on this line, consumption of each good has increased by the same 
factor. For an income increase (parallel shift in the budget line through 1) that makes bundle 2 
affordable, bundle 2 should be chosen, so that the indifference curve through bundle 2 must 
have the same slope. In order to highlight the relation between homotheticity and symmetric 
substitutability, the income increase from bundle 1 to bundle 2 can be split up in a price 
decrease in good 1 (from bundle 1 to bundle 3), and an equi-proportional price decrease in 
good 2 (from bundle 3 to bundle 2). This is because two equi-proportional price decreases are 
equivalent to an income increase. In Figure 2a, each good is a gross complement to the other 
good, in Figure 2b, both goods are neither gross complements nor gross substitutes. In Figure 
2c finally, each good is a gross substitute for the other good. The relation between 
homotheticity and symmetric substitutability is especially clear in Figure 2b. By the fact that 
the line connecting bundles 1 and 3 is horizontal, good 2 is neither a substitute for nor a 
complement to good 1. If the line connecting bundles 3 and 2 would not be vertical, so that it 
is not the case that good 1 is neither a substitute for nor a complement to good 1, bundle 2 
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Figure 2. Homothetic preferences and strong symmetric gross substitutability 
 
 
We now show that another way to state the necessary condition for Giffen behaviour that 
there is a necessity and a luxury is to say that the gross cross-price effects on each good are 
not equal. We refer to this property as weak asymmetric gross substitutability. 
 
Definition 4. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterized by weak asymmetric gross 
substitutability if  ) / ( ) / ( 1 2 2 1 p x p x ∂ ∂ ≠ ∂ ∂ . 
 
This leads us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. Good 1 is locally a necessity and good 2 is a luxury if and only if  locally 
) / ( ) / ( 1 2 2 1 p x p x ∂ ∂ ≠ ∂ ∂  (= weak asymmetric substitutability). More precisely, good 1 is locally 
a necessity and good 2 is a luxury if and only if locally  ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 1 2 p x p x ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ . 
Proof:  
Given again that  ) / ( ) / ( 1 2 2 1 p h p h ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , and combining (4) and (5), we see that 
) / ( ) / ( 2 1 1 2 p x p x ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ m x m x 2 1 ε ε < ⇔ . By (3),  m x m x 2 1 ε ε <  implies that  m x m x 2 1 1 ε ε < < . QED 
 
Given that weak asymmetric income elasticity is a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour 
and is synonymous to weak asymmetric gross substitutability, the latter is also a necessary 
condition for Giffen behaviour. In general, a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour is 
asymmetry in the consumers’ preferences. This asymmetry can be stated as weak asymmetric 
income elasticity, where good 1 is a necessity and good 2 is a luxury. As shown by 
Proposition 4, this turns out to be the same as saying that the gross cross-price effect of the 
price of good 2 on the consumption of good 1 is higher than the cross-price effect of the price 
of good 1 on the consumption of good 2. How to interpret this result intuitively? The case is 
made here for interpreting this as good 1 being a better gross substitute for good 2 than good 2 
is for good 1. The reader may oppose that this is a contentious interpretation, as absolute 
cross-price effects are compared, rather than cross-price elasticities. Yet, the following 
counterarguments may be presented. First, while the individual cross-price effects are not 
unit-independent, the property of unequal absolute cross-price effects for non-homothetic 
preferences is unit independent. Thus, whatever it measures, the property 
) / ( ) / ( 2 1 1 2 p x p x ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂  is unit independent – where no claims need to be made that the extent 
to which  ) / ( 1 2 p x ∂ ∂  is smaller than  ) / ( 2 1 p x ∂ ∂  measures any degree of asymmetric gross 
substitutability. 
Second, it should be noted that if one takes the difference between the cross-price 
elasticities as a measure of asymmetric substitutability, then it should be noted that the 
1  3 
2 
(a) (b) (c) 










x1   7
relation between 
1 2 p x ε  and 
2 1p x ε  is affected by the budget shares spent on each good. 
Intuitively, if goods 1 and 2 are mutual gross substitutes, and if more is spent on good 2 than 
on good 1, then an increase in the price of good 2 has a larger impact than an increase in the 
price of good 1. In order to exclude the effects of budget shares, a case can be made for 
comparing the absolute cross-price effects rather than the cross-price elasticities. In this sense, 
in the case of homothetic preferences, due to the equal absolute cross-price effects, any 
differences in cross-price elasticities are purely due to differences in budget shares. Net of the 
effect of budget shares, goods may be considered as gross symmetrically substitutable, and as 
equally good gross substitutes for or gross complements to one another. In the same manner, 
with non-homothetic preferences, with good 1 a potential Giffen good, we interpret good 1 as 
being a better gross substitute for good 2 than good 2 is for good 1. 
Intuitively, let good 1 be bread, and let good 2 be yachts. From the perspective of 
subsistence, bread is a better substitute for yachts than yachts are for bread. You can eat 
bread, but you cannot eat yachts. There is a one-to-one relationship of this fact with 
asymmetric income elasticity. Given that bread is a necessity, if the price of yachts increases, 
the income effect of this on bread is relatively small, so that the consumption of bread 
changes relatively much, as the impact of the substitution effect is only slightly limited by the 
income effect. Given that yachts are a luxury, if the price of bread increases, the income effect 
of this on the consumption of yachts is relatively large, so that the consumption of yachts 
decreases relatively little, as the impact of the substitution effect is considerably limited by the 
income effect. 
The one-to-one relation between weak asymmetric income elasticity and weak asymmetric 
substitutability is shown graphically in Figure 3. Given that rational consumers are not subject 
to money illusion, the effect of an income increase from bundle 1 to bundle 2 can be split up 
in a decrease in the price of good 2 from bundle 1 to bundle 3, plus an equi-proportional 
decrease in the price of good 1 from bundle 3 to bundle  2 or bundle 2’. Bundle 2’ is the 
bundle that is obtained if the consumer has homothetic preferences, and has income expansion 
paths that are straight lines through the origin. As shown in Proposition 1 and illustrated in 
Figure 2, the goods are then equally good gross substitutes. In Figure 3a, we make preferences 
non-homothetic by making good 2 a worse gross substitute for good 1, so that higher-up 
indifference curves become flatter; the income expansion path running through bundles 1 and 
2 has a convex shape, so that good 1 is a necessity and good 2 a luxury. We thus move in the 
direction of good 1 being a Giffen good. In Figure 3b, we make preferences non-homothetic 
by making good 2 a better gross substitute for good 1, so that higher-up indifference curves 
become steeper; the income expansion path running through bundles 1 and 2 is concave so 
that good 1 is a luxury and good 2 a necessity. We thus move further away from good 1 being 

























Figure 3 Non-homothetic preferences and weak asymmetric gross substitutability 
 
 
2.4. Good 1 gross substitute for good 2, good 2 gross complement to good 1: strong 
asymmetric gross substitutability 
 
We now show that a more detailed necessary condition for Giffen behaviour is that the 
gross cross-price effects on each good have opposite signs. Thus, in order to have Giffen 
behaviour, not only must preferences be asymmetric in the sense that one good 1 is a better 
gross substitute for good 2 than good 2 is for good 1, they must be asymmetric in the sense 
that good 1 is a gross substitute for good 2 while good 2 is a gross complement to good 1. We 
define such a phenomenon as strong asymmetric substitutability. 
 
Definition 5. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterized by strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability if  ) / ( ) / ( 1 2 2 1 p x sign p x sign ∂ ∂ ≠ ∂ ∂ . 
 
This leads us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5. A necessary condition for good 1 to be locally a Giffen good is that the 
preferences over goods 1 and 2 are locally characterized by strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability, where that good 1 is a gross substitute for good 2 ( 0 / 2 1 > ∂ ∂ p x ), while good 2 
is a gross complement to good 1 ( 0 / 1 2 < ∂ ∂ p x )  
Proof: 
By budget balancedness,  m x p x p = + 2 2 1 1 . If good 1 is a Giffen good, and p1 increases, then 
x1 increases as well. It follows that p1x1 increases, so that in order for the consumer to spend 
the entire budget, x2 must fall. It follows that a necessary condition for good 1 to be a Giffen 
good is that   0 / 1 2 < ∂ ∂ p x , meaning that good 2 is a gross complement to good 1. We already 
know that any Giffen good is an inferior good, so that in equation (4),  0 / 1 < ∂ ∂ m x . As the 
Hicksian cross-price effect is necessarily positive, it follows that when good 1 is a Giffen 
good, good 1 must be a gross substitute for good 2. QED 
 
Strong asymmetric gross substitutability is not a familiar concept in the literature, and many 
economists seem to be unaware of its possibility, yet it is perfectly in line with rational 














car for larger trips. The larger car is a complement to the small car; it is not a substitute for the 
smaller car, because it is too big for parking in the city (imagine that the larger car is one of 
the bigger four-wheel drives on the market). But the smaller car may at the same time be a 
substitute for the larger car: if larger cars become too expensive, the family will only keep a 
smaller car for driving both small and larger distances (imagine that the smaller car is still a 
reasonable family car, so that larger distances are not that uncomfortable with the smaller 
car). For other potential examples, see De Jaegher (2009). 
 
 
2.5. Strong asymmetric price elasticity 
 
As we show in this section, a necessary condition for local Giffen behaviour is that locally, 
it is the case for good 1 that   1
1 1 − > p x ε  (the demand for good 1 either has a negative slope and 
is price inelastic, or has a positive slope), and that ( 1
2 2 − < p x ε ) (the demand for good 2 has a 
negative slope and is price elastic). We do  this by showing that this necessary condition is 
fully equivalent to the necessary condition of strong asymmetric substitutability treated in 
Section 2.4. 
We say that two goods are characterized by weak symmetric elasticity if both price 
elasticities are smaller than minus one, or both are larger than minus one. 
 
Definition 6. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterised by weak symmetric price elasticity 
if locally either  1
1 1 − < p x ε  and 1
2 2 − < p x ε  (both goods have a downward-sloping demand and 
are price elastic), or  1
1 1 − > p x ε  and 1
2 2 − > p x ε  (each good has a downward-sloping demand 
and is price inelastic, or is upward sloping). 
 
One could also define the concepts of strong symmetric price elasticity, where both goods 
have exactly the same elasticity, and weak asymmetric price elasticity, where one good is 
more elastic than the other, but it need not be the case that one good is elastic and the other 
inelastic. These concepts, however, tell little about preferences, because relative elasticity 
depends also on the relative budget shares of each good. This is why we only additionally 
define the concept of strong asymmetric elasticity. 
 
Definition 7. Two goods 1 and 2 are locally characterised by strong asymmetric price 
elasticity if locally either  1
1 1 − < p x ε  (good 1 has a negatively sloped demand and is price 
elastic) and 1
2 2 − > p x ε  (good 2 has a negatively-sloped demand and is price inelastic, or it has 
a positively-sloped demand), or  1
1 1 − > p x ε  (good 1 has a negatively-sloped demand and is 
price inelastic, or it has a positively-sloped demand) and 1
2 2 − < p x ε  (good 2 has a negatively-
sloped demand and is price elastic). 
 
We can now state the following proposition, showing equivalence between strong 
asymmetric price elasticity and strong asymmetric gross substitutability, and between strong 
symmetric price . 
 
Proposition 6. Strong asymmetric price elasticity is fully equivalent to strong asymmetric 
gross substitutability, and is a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour. Weak symmetric 
price elasticity is fully equivalent to weak symmetric gross substitutability, and if there is 
weak symmetric price elasticity, there cannot be Giffen behaviour.    10
Proof:  
By budget balancedness, the consumer always uses up the complete budget, so that it must 
be the case that  j i j i i x p p p m x ) / ( / − =  for  2 , 1 , = j i  and  j i ≠ . Taking the derivative of this 
expression with respect to pi, and expressing in terms of elasticities, we obtain that 
 
1 2 1 1 ) / ( 1 1 2 p x p x s s ε ε − − =    (6) 
2 1 2 2 ) / ( 1 2 1 p x p x s s ε ε − − =  (7) 
 
By equations (6) and (7), good 1 is a gross substitute for good 2 ( 0
2 1 > p x ε ) and good 2 is a 
gross complement to good 1 ( 0
1 2 < p x ε ) (i.e., strong asymmetric gross substitutability) if and 
only if  1
1 1 − > p x ε  (the demand for good 1 is downward sloping and inelastic, or is upward 
sloping), and  1
2 2 − < p x ε  (the demand for good 2 is downward-sloping and elastic) (i.e. strong 
asymmetric price elasticity). As by Proposition 5 strong asymmetric gross substitutability is a 
necessary condition for Giffen behaviour, and as we have just shown strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability is equivalent to strong asymmetric price elasticity, it follows that strong 
asymmetric price elasticity is a necessary condition for Giffen behaviour. 
Further, by equations (6) and (7), both goods are gross complements to one another, 
meaning that,  0
2 1 < p x ε  and  0
1 2 < p x ε  (weak symmetric gross substitutability), if and only if 
1
1 1 − > p x ε  and  1
2 2 − > p x ε . Given that strong gross asymmetric substitutability is a necessary 
condition for Giffen behaviour, it follows that both goods are gross complements to one 
another if and only if  1 0
1 1 − > > p x ε  and  1 0
2 2 − > > p x ε .  
Similarly, both goods are gross substitutes to one another, meaning that  0
2 1 > p x ε  and 
0
1 2 > p x ε  (weak symmetric gross substitutability), if and only if the demands for both goods 
are down-ward sloping and price elastic, meaning that  1
1 1 − < p x ε  and  1
2 2 − < p x ε . We have 
thus established that weak symmetric gross substitutability is fully equivalent to weak 
symmetric price elasticity. As strong asymmetric gross substitutability is a necessary 
condition for Giffen behaviour, it follows that if there is weak symmetric gross substitutability 
and with is weak symmetric price elasticity, there cannot be Giffen behaviour. QED 
 
A corollary of Proposition 6 is that we can narrow down the case of weak symmetric price 
elasticity with  1
1 1 − > p x ε  and 1
2 2 − > p x ε  to the case where the demand for both goods are 
downward-sloping and price inelastic. 
 
Corollary 2. Let preferences be locally characterised by weak symmetric price elasticity with 
1
1 1 − > p x ε  and  1
2 2 − > p x ε . Then  1 0
1 1 − > > p x ε  and  1 0
2 2 − > > p x ε . 
Proof: Given Proposition 6, if there is Giffen behaviour on good 1, it must be that the demand 
for good 2 is downward sloping. So it cannot be that  0
1 1 > p x ε  and  0
2 2 > p x ε . Further, if there 
is Giffen behaviour on good 1, then it must be that  1
2 2 − < p x ε , which is incompatible with the 
given case. It follows that there cannot be Giffen behaviour on any of the goods for the given 
case. QED 
 
We conclude that necessary conditions for Giffen behaviour are found in several ways in 
which preferences are asymmetric. One good should be a necessity, and one good should be a 
luxury, and goods should not be equally-good gross substitutes for each other. The asymmetry   11
should even be more extreme, in that good 1 should be inferior, and good 2 should be a 
luxury. Also, good 1 should be a gross substitute for good 2, and good 2 a gross complement 
to good 1, which is exactly equivalent to saying that good 1 should be price inelastic, and 
good 2 price elastic. The necessary conditions are summarised in Table 1. Note that 
1
1 1 − > p x ε , 1
2 2 − < p x ε  is used as a necessary condition rather than the necessary (and 
sufficient) condition  0
1 1 > p x ε , 1
2 2 − < p x ε  because we are interested in wider classes of local 
preferences that have some of the characteristics of Giffen behaviour. 
 
 
  Good 1  Good 2 
Weak asymmetric income elasticity  1
1 < m x ε  1
2 > m x ε  
Weak asymmetric gross substitutability  1 2 2 1 / / p x p x ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  
 
Strong asymmetric income elasticity  0
1 < m x ε  1
2 > m x ε  
Strong asymmetric gross substitutability 
 
0 / 2 1 > ∂ ∂ p x   0 / 1 2 < ∂ ∂ p x  
Strong asymmetric price elasticity  1
1 1 − > p x ε  1
2 2 − < p x ε  
 
Table 1. Necessary conditions for Giffen behaviour 
 
 
The reader will be well aware that a necessary condition for good 1 to be a Giffen good is 
that good 1 is an inferior good, and good 2 a luxury (strong asymmetric income elasticity), 
and may find the necessary condition that good 1 is price inelastic and good 2 price elastic 
(strong asymmetric price elasticity) self-evident. The additional necessary condition that good 
1 is a gross substitute for good 2, and good 2 a gross complement to good 1 (strong 
asymmetric gross substitutability) is novel, and the reader may be surprised to find out that 
such a phenomenon is possible. But the reader may wonder about its relevance to the analysis 
of Giffen behaviour. If local preferences such that good 1 is an inferior good and good 2 is a 
luxury (strong asymmetric income elasticity) are a strict subset of local preferences such that 
good 1 is a substitute for good 2 and good 2 is a complement to good 1 (strong asymmetric 
substitutability), then the familiar strong asymmetric income elasticity remains the relevant 
concept to analyse Giffen behaviour, as it brings us closest to Giffen behaviour. 
As shown in the next section, this is not the case. Preferences that are (locally) characterised 
by strong asymmetric income elasticity need not be characterised by strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability, and vice versa. Giffen behaviour is only possible if preferences have both 
these characteristics. This itself makes strong asymmetric gross substitutability a useful 
necessary condition that more precisely pins down the characteristics of Giffen behaviour. 
Further, preferences cannot be excluded such that good 1 is an inferior good and good 2 a 
luxury, but where good 1 is price elastic and good 2 is price inelastic, which is the opposite of 
what should be the case for Giffen behaviour. If the reader accepts that a case where good 1 is 
price inelastic and good 2 price elastic is qualitatively similar to Giffen behaviour, and 
constitutes what could be termed near-Giffen behaviour, then strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability can be argued to be a more relevant condition for identifying Giffen or near-
Giffen behaviour. Given that strong asymmetric gross substitutability is fully equivalent to 
strong asymmetric price elasticity (see Proposition 6), the former guarantees that  1
1 1 − > p x ε  
and that  1
2 2 − < p x ε , which leaves the possibility of Giffen behaviour on good 1, and even if   12
good 1 has a downward sloping, price inelastic demand could in any case be said to approach 
Giffen behaviour. Further, given that strong asymmetric gross substitutability implies weak 
asymmetric gross substitutability, and given that the latter is fully equivalent to weak 
asymmetric income elasticity (Proposition 4), it also guarantees that good 1 is a necessity and 
good 2 is a luxury, again making such a case qualitatively similar to Giffen behaviour. All in 
all, an analysis of the relations between the necessary conditions listed in this section is called 




3. Relation between necessary conditions 
 
 
Figure 4 Relations between the sets of local preferences meeting the necessary conditions 
 
 
In order to characterise the relation between the necessary conditions listed in Section 2, we 
represent the relations between sets of corresponding local preferences by means of Figure 4, 
where ovals represent these sets. The labels at the bottom refer to characteristics of local 
preferences inside the sets. The labels at the top of the figure each time refer to characteristics 
of the local preferences that lie exactly on the boundaries of one or more of the sets, i.e., local 
preferences which just fail to belong to one set, or local preferences which lie on the boundary 
separating one set from another. All the characteristics in Figure 4 refer to local 
characteristics of preferences: e.g. a consumer’s preferences may only be locally homothetic. 
The set of all preferences is represented by the area of the large dashed oval in Figure 4, 
including its dotted boundary. Exactly on the dotted boundary of this set lie the locally 
homothetic preferences, where locally all goods are neither luxuries nor necessities and have 
unit income elasticity (strong symmetric income elasticity), which is equivalent to having 
equal gross cross-price effects (strong symmetric gross substitutability). The open set 
contained inside the large dashed oval is the set of the locally non-homothetic preferences, 
where the two goods locally have different income elasticities (weak asymmetric income 
elasticity), which is fully equivalent to having different gross cross-price effects (weak 
asymmetric gross substitutability). 
The open set consisting of the dashed area contained within the dashed-dotted oval is the set 
of local preferences where locally one good is an inferior good, and the other one good is a 
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local preferences where locally one good is neither an inferior good nor a normal good, and 
the other good is a luxury. These are the well-known quasilinear preferences. For all local 
preferences outside of the dashed-dotted oval, it is the case that both goods are normal goods 
(weak symmetric income elasticity).
2 
The open set consisting of the grey area contained within the dotted oval is the set of local 
preferences where locally one good is a gross substitute for the other good, and the other good 
is a gross complement to the first good (strong asymmetric gross substitutability), which is 
equivalent to the first good being price inelastic, and the second good being price elastic 
(strong asymmetric price elasticity). Exactly on the dotted oval itself lie the local preferences 
where locally one good is either gross substitute for or a gross complement to the other good, 
and the other good is neither a gross substitute for nor a gross complement to the first good. 
The first good is then has unit price elasticity, whereas the other good is either price elastic of 
price inelastic. As shown in De Jaegher (2008), preferences that are locally characterised by a 
quasiloglinear utility function have these characteristics, and take the functional form 
1
1 2 2 1 ) ( ) , (
− = x f x x x u , where  ) ( 1 2 x f x =  is a single downward sloping, strictly convex and 
continuous indifference curve from which this utility function is derived. For all local 
preferences outside of the dotted oval, it is locally the case that both goods are gross 
complements to one another, both goods are gross substitutes for one another, or both goods 
are neither gross substitutes for nor gross complements to one another
3 (weak symmetric gross 
substitutability). It is the case that both goods are ordinary goods and are both price inelastic, 
both price elastic, or both price unit elastic (weak symmetric price elasticity). 
Local preferences that lie both exactly on the dotted oval and exactly on the dashed-dotted 
oval have the characteristics that good 1 is neither a normal nor an inferior good, is a gross 
substitute for good 2, and is unit elastic; good 2 is a neither a gross substitute for nor a gross 
complement to good 1, is price elastic, and is a luxury. As pointed out in De Jaegher (2008), 
preferences that are locally both quasilinear and quasiloglinear have these characteristics, and 
take the form 
2
1 2 1 ) , (
x ae x x x u = , where a is any positive real number. 
Finally, the open set consisting of the dark grey area contained within the dashed circle is 
the set of local preferences where locally one good is a Giffen good. Exactly on the dashed 
circle lie the local preferences where locally one good is neither an ordinary good nor a Giffen 
good, and where the other good is an ordinary good. As shown in De Jaegher (2008), 
preferences that are locally characterised by the utility function  [] 1 1 2 2 1 / ) ( ) , ( x x f x x x u − = , 
where  ) ( 1 2 x f x =  is again a single downward sloping, strictly convex and continuous 
indifference curve from which this utility function is derived, have this property. Outside of 
the dashed circle lie all local preferences where both goods are ordinary goods. 
In part, the rationale for the manner in which Figure 4 is drawn is immediately clear. Local 
preferences where locally one good is neither an inferior good nor a normal good cannot at 
the same time be homothetic, so that the set of local preferences characterised by strong 
asymmetric income elasticity cannot at the same time by homothetic, and must lie strictly 
within the set of non-homothetic preferences. Similarly, local preferences where locally, one 
good is neither a substitute for nor a complement to the other good, whereas the other good is 
a substitute for the first good, cannot at the same time be characterised by strong symmetric 
gross substitutability, and must therefore again lie strictly within the set of non-homothetic 
                                                 
2 Homothetic utility functions are represented as a boundary case, because they lie on the boundary of the case 
where good 1 is a luxury and good 2 a necessity, and the case where good 1 is a necessity and good 2 a luxury. 
In a more extensive figure, one can represent these two cases as two separate sets each time with the same form 
as Figure 4, with homothetic utility functions on the boundary of these two sets. 
3 In the case that both goods are neither gross substitutes for nor gross complements to one another, we have the 
Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which are a special case of the homothetic utility functions.   14
preferences. Finally, local preferences where one good is neither a Giffen good nor an 
ordinary good by the analysis in Section 2 cannot have a good which is neither an inferior 
good nor a normal good, or a good which is neither a substitute for nor a complement to the 
other good. It follows that the set of local preferences characterised by Giffen behaviour must 
lie strictly within the set of local preferences characterised by strong asymmetric income 
elasticity and strong asymmetric gross substitutability. Finally, the set of local preferences 
characterised by Giffen behaviour is not empty: see Heijman and v. Mouche (2009) for 
references. 
The reason why we have not drawn the set of local preferences characterised by strong 
asymmetric income elasticity as a subset of the local preferences characterised by strong 
asymmetric gross substitutability, or vice versa, needs further justification. Consider 
preferences locally characterised by a  quasilinear utility function of the form 
[]
) / 1 ( 1
1
1
2 2 1 ) / 1 ( 1 ) , (
ε ε
− − − + = x x x x u , with  1 > ε . It can be checked that this utility function is 
well-behaved. The demand for good 1 equals 
ε − = ) / ( 2 1 1 p p x  (where ε is the absolute value of 
the fixed own-price elasticity of good 1), the demand for good 2 equals 
ε − − =
1
2 1 2 2 ) / ( ) / ( p p p m x . Good 1 is neither an inferior good nor a normal good, and good 2 




2 1 2 1 p p p p x − − = ∂ ∂
− −ε ε  is larger than zero, and that 
) / 1 ( ) / )( 1 ( / 2 2 1 1 2 p p p p x
ε ε
− − − = ∂ ∂  is larger than zero if  1 > ε . This shows that we can find 
local preferences on the boundary of the set of preferences characterised by strong 
asymmetric income elasticity, which are not characterised by strong asymmetric grods 
substitutability. 
Next, consider preferences locally characterised by a quasiloglinear utility function of the 
form  [] ()
[] ) 1 /( / ) 1 (
1 2 2 1 1 ) , (
− − − − =
ε ε ε ε x x x x u , where  1 0 < <ε . It can again be checked that this 
utility function is well-behaved. The demand functions corresponding to this utility function 
are 
ε ) / ( 1 1 p m x =  and 
ε ) / )( / ( ) / ( 1 2 1 2 2 p m p p p m x − = . Good 1 is price inelastic, is a necessity 
but not an inferior good, and is neither a gross substitute for nor a gross complement to good 
1. Good 2 is unit elastic, is a luxury, and is a gross complement to good 1. It follows that there 
are local preferences on the boundary of the preferences with strong asymmetric 
substitutability that are not characterised by strong asymmetric income elasticity. 
To further highlight the importance of strong asymmetric gross substitutability for Giffen 
behaviour, it is now shown that strong asymmetric income elasticity, with a low income 
elasticity for good 1 and a high income elasticity for good 2 is no guarantee that good 1 has a 
downward sloping demand and is price inelastic or has an upward sloping demand, and that 
good 2 is relatively price elastic (as should be the case under Giffen behaviour or near-Giffen 
behaviour). Let a consumer’s preferences locally be given by the quasilinear utility function 
of the form 
2
1 1 2 2 1 ) 2 /( 1 ) / ( ) , ( x b x b a x x x u − + = , where  0 , > b a . The demand for good 1 locally 
equals  ) / ( 2 1 1 p p b a x − = , the demand for good 2 locally equals 
) / ( ) / ( ) / (
2
2 1 2 2 2 p p b p a p m x + − = . It can be checked that for a = 10, b = 1, p1 = 9, p2 = 1, m = 
100, while good 1 has zero income elasticity and good 2 is a luxury, good 1 is price elastic, 
while good 2 is price inelastic, which is completely the opposite of what we need for 
approaching Giffen behaviour on good 1. In this particular example, as the demand for good 1 
is linear, as long as p1 is high enough, the price elasticity of good 1 can take on any height 
desired.  
In the next section, we give an intuition why a subclass of inferior goods may be price 
elastic rather than price inelastic, whereas the composite good is a luxury and is price 
inelastic. This is argued to be plausible in the case of the standard textbook example of an   15
inferior good, namely a low-quality good, and where the composite good is then considered as 
a high-quality good.  
 
 
4. Low-quality and high-quality goods 
 
The previous analysis has shown that, in order to make it possible that good 1 is a Giffen 
good, not only does it need to be the case that good 1 is an inferior good and good 2 a luxury 
(strong asymmetric income elasticity), it also needs to be the case that good 1 is a gross 
substitute for good 2 while good 2 is a gross complement to good 1 (strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability). Further, it has been shown that the latter condition alone suffices to obtain a 
situation that bears resemblance to the case of Giffen behaviour, where good 1 is price 
inelastic and good 2 is price inelastic, whereas the former condition in isolation can lead to a 
situation that is quite different from the case of Giffen behaviour, namely one where good 1 is 
price elastic and good 2 is price inelastic. The current section attempts to support this result 
with intuition, and therefore mainly consists of verbal arguments – even though these are 
again partially backed up by analysis.  
By Definition 2, strong asymmetric income elasticity means that one of the goods is an 
inferior good. The definition of inferior goods does not refer in any way to the quality of the 
good involved, yet the term inferior suggests an association with goods of inferior quality. 
Indeed, as argued by Varian (2003, p.96) “examples (of inferior goods) (…) include (…) any 
kind of low-quality good”. In the context of a simple two-good dichotomy, an example is the 
case where a consumer consumes only a low-quality good such as hamburgers, and a high-
quality good such as sirloin steak. Intuitively, when the consumer’s income increases, the 
quantity of hamburgers consumed relative to the quantity of sirloin steaks decreases; put 
otherwise, the income expansion paths are convex. Thus the income elasticity of sirloin steaks 
is larger than the income elasticity of hamburgers. This need not imply that fewer hamburgers 
are consumed in absolute terms as income gets higher. People with a high income may 
continue to enjoy a hamburger every now and then, and a higher income may still lead to 
relatively small increases in the total consumption of hamburgers, so that we only have weak 
asymmetric income elasticity. But one can envisage also that the demand for hamburgers of a 
consumer would decrease with income. The fact that of two goods, one good has low and the 
other good has high quality is then equated to strong asymmetric income elasticity. 
Analytically, let us take the difference between the left-hand sides of equations (1) and (2), 
and equate this to the difference between the right-hand sides, to obtain: 
 









































Then, keeping the difference between the Hicksian own-price effects constant, this argument 
says that we decrease the quality of good 1 and increase the quality of good 2 by making the 
income elasticity of good 1 smaller and the income elasticity of good 2 larger. Graphically, 
this has the following effect on an indifference map. Start from a given indifference curve u0, 
and assume that the shape of this particular indifference curve is not affected at all by changes 
in the relative quality of the goods. This assures that, as long as the consumer’s starting point 
is a bundle on this fixed indifference curve, the size of the Hicksian own-price effects and 
with it the size of the substitution effect is unaffected by changes in the relative quality of the 
goods. This is true no matter how the change in relative quality affects the rest of the 
indifference curve map. In order to decrease the quality of good 1 with respect to the quality   16
of good 2, by assumption, we can now make the income elasticity of good 1 smaller 
compared to the income elasticity of good 2. The simplest manner to do this is by taking 
quasilinear preferences, so that indifference curves are vertical shifts of u0, as illustrated in 
Figure 5a. By making the income elasticity of good 1 smaller and smaller with respect to the 
income elasticity of good 2, we deviate further and further from homothetic preferences, so 
that we can eventually reach the case where the price elasticity of good 1 is zero, as is the case 
in Figure 5b. As the substitution effect remains fixed in size on u0, it follows that the price 
elasticity of good 1 is decreased, and the price elasticity of good 2 is increased, as can be seen 
from equation (8). It thus seems that as we are making the quality of good 1 smaller compared 
to the quality of good 2, we are making good 1 less and less elastic, and are in this way 
moving towards the case of Giffen behaviour. In general, from this point of view, low-quality 
goods would seem price inelastic relative to high-quality goods. Indeed, it seems intuitive that 
e.g. a 10% discount on the name-brand (and presumably high-quality) variant of a commodity 
for sale in a supermarket chain would have a more important effect on demand than a 10% 
discount on the supermarket chain’s own-brand (and presumably low-quality) variant of this 
commodity. The 10% discount means an increase in purchasing power, which by the fact that 









Yet, the manner in which one indifference curve is positioned with respect to another is just 
one way in which the indifference map may be affected when the quality of good 1 is 
decreased with respect to the quality of good 2. The shape of each individual indifference 
curve could be affected as well. To fix ideas on how this shape may be affected, consider the 
extreme case where good 1 is of better quality than good 2 in the sense that good 1 is identical 
to good 2, with the exception that it gives more value per unit bought; for instance, good 1 is 
exactly the same commodity as good 2, but sold in a bigger package. The utility function then 
locally has the form  2 1 2 1 ) , ( bx ax x x u + = , which leads to the bold linear indifference curves 
represented in Figure 6. Additionally, it is assumed that preferences are homothetic, so that 
the tastes of consumers over low- and high-quality goods are not affected by purchasing 
power. In Figure 6a,  b a > , so that good 1 has higher quality than good 2: it takes relatively 
many units of good 2 to substitute for good 1 along any indifference curve. An increase in the 
price of good 1 leads to a moderate change in the consumption of good 1, because the low-
quality good 2 is not a good substitute for it. In Figure 6b,  a b > , so that good 2 is now the 
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the consumption of good 1, because good 2 is a good substitute for good 1. This suggests that 
high-quality goods are relatively price inelastic, and low-quality goods relatively price elastic. 
Intuitively, if ersatz coffee becomes more expensive, then the impact may be large, as a 
superior substitute is available in the form of real coffee. If ersatz coffee becomes expensive 
as well, why drink it at all? If real coffee becomes more expensive, the impact may be small, 
because only an inferior substitute is available in the form of ersatz coffee. 
It should be noted that this argument is not specific to linear indifference curves, where it is 
always optimal for the consumer to consume either one good or the other. In reality, the 
consumer may value specific characteristics of low-quality goods, so that indifference curves 
have a convex shape. But this does not affect the argument that any given indifference curve 
becomes flatter as the quality of good 1 decreases with respect to the quality of good 2. 
Analytically, the argument that we are making here is that, when the quality of good 1 is 
decreased with respect to the quality of good 2, in equation (8),  1 1/ p h ∂ ∂  is increased with 
respect to  2 2 / p h ∂ ∂ . If at the same time income elasticities remain constant because 
preferences over quality do not change with purchasing power, then by equation (8) this 





Figure 6 Price inelastic high-quality goods (left) and price elastic low-quality goods (right). 
Thick lines are indifference curves, thin lines are budget lines. 
 
 
In this argument, there are two factors affecting the elasticity of goods as a function of their 
quality, and these two factors have opposite effects. From the perspective of the substitution 
effect, low-quality goods are relatively elastic, because they have good substitutes in the form 
of high-quality goods. From the perspective of the income effect, low-quality goods are 
inelastic: an increase in the price of low-quality goods decreases the purchasing power of the 
consumer, which from this point of view may lead him to buy more of the low-quality good. 
If a decrease in the quality of good 1 relative to good 2 mainly affects the substitution 
effect, then it is the case that inferior goods are price elastic, and luxuries price inelastic, 
meaning that we are then further away from the case of Giffen behaviour, rather than closer to 
it.  For instance, Figure 7 represents an example where, in the logic of the argument, good 1 is 
x1 
x2  x2 
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of high quality and good 2 is of low quality. The indifference curves are steep, because 
consumers need a lot of good 2 in exchange for one unit of good 1. Higher indifference curves 
are steeper, so that income increases lead to relatively more consumption of good 1, and 
relatively less consumption of good 2. The fact that good 2 is of low quality makes the 
substitution effect small, while the fact that good 1 is of high quality assures a positive income 
effect. In Figure 8, good 1 is of low quality and good 2 of high quality, as seen by the fact that 
the indifference curves are flat, and get flatter as utility increases. Nevertheless, compared to 
Figure 7, the price elasticity of demand is increased. This is because of the relatively large 
substitution effect, meaning that the effect of the argument that the demand for the low-
quality good is elastic as there is a good substitute for it, is dominant. Comparing Figure 7 to 
Figure 8, decreasing the quality of good 1 relative to good 2 in this example mainly affects the 
substitution effect and only has limited effect on the income effect, so that a good becomes 
more price elastic as it quality decreases. 
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Given this intuition, we argue that in fact for good 1 to be close to a Giffen good, it must be 
a high-quality good. This is obvious from the fact that the consumer’s current indifference 
curve is then relatively steep, so that the substitution effect for good 1 in equation (1) is also 
small. The income effect will now additionally be small if the consumer cares less about the 
quality of good 1 the higher is his purchasing power. This is possible in the following manner. 
Let us again take the example of the family that considers buying a smaller and/or a larger 
car. As we now want to argue, the smaller car is not in fact a low-quality good, but is instead a 
high-quality good, as it can both be used for driving and parking in the city, and (with 
moderate inconvenience) for larger trips (again, the smaller car is still a reasonably sized 
family car). As the larger car is not suitable for driving and parking in the city, it is from this 
perspective a low-quality good (again, it is one of the large four-wheel drives on the market). 
At the same time, the larger car is a luxury and the smaller car is a necessity. The fact that the 
larger car is of low quality and is at the same time a luxury is not a paradox: it is exactly when 
the family has high purchasing power that it can afford a good that can exclusively be put to 
the particular use of driving outside of the city. The fact that the smaller car both does not 
have good substitutes (small substitution effect) and is a necessity (small income effect) 
makes the small car a good that unambiguously has small price elasticity. 
The relation of the smaller-car larger-car example with strong asymmetric gross 
substitutability is the following. If the price of the larger car increases, two things happen. 
First, the family’s appreciation of the quality of the smaller car increases, and may increase 
heavily, because the family becomes willing to use the smaller car for the job normally done 
by the large car, namely making larger trips. Further, along the indifference curve, the family 
makes use of the high quality of smaller cars to substitute in favour of smaller cars. It follows 
that smaller cars are a gross substitute for large cars. If the price of the smaller car decreases, 
two things happen. First, because along one and the same indifference curve larger cars are 
not a very good substitute for smaller cars, the consumption of large cars does not change 
very much. But because the family has more purchasing power, it cares less about the ability 
of small cars to do both jobs of driving in the city and driving longer trips. For this reason, the 
family buys more larger cars. It follows that large cars are a gross complement to small cars. 
It should be noted that our focus on Giffen behaviour as an instance of strong asymmetric 
substitutability can be linked to two approaches for analysing Giffen behaviour found in the 
literature (for a detailed analysis of the links to these two approaches, see De Jaegher, 2009). 
In the subsistence-constraint approach (Gilley and Karels, 1991), the consumer has standard 
preferences over two goods, but additionally has a subsistence constraint. As long as this 
constraint is slack, the consumer behaves normally. However, when hitting the subsistence 
constraint, the consumer’s first priority is to at least stay on this constraint. If one of the goods 
is better at providing subsistence, then an increase in its price may cause larger consumption 
of it. The connection with strong asymmetric gross substitutability is that, for low purchasing 
power, the quality of subsistence becomes more important to the consumer. In the car 
example, subsistence means being able to drive both small and larger trips. Given that smaller 
cars are good at providing subsistence, more of them may get consumed as their price 
increases. A second approach to analysing Giffen behaviour is to apply Lancaster’s (1966) 
characteristics approach (Jensen and Miller, 2008). In the car example, we could say that the 
consumer cares about two characteristics, namely being able to drive everywhere, and being 
able to drive comfortably (i.e., in a larger car). For low purchasing power, the characteristic of 
being able to drive everywhere is more important to the consumer, so that the smaller car is 
bought more often. 
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5. Alternative decompositions of the own price effect 
 
A well-known characteristic of a Giffen good is that it is an inferior good. This justifies 
explaining Giffen behaviour in terms of Hicksian (or alternatively: Slutsky) decomposition 
into a substitution effect and an income effect, where for Giffen behaviour the positive 
income effect of a price increase dominates the negative substitution effect. As we have 
shown, a further characteristic of preferences over two goods that allow for a Giffen good is 
that the two goods are characterised by strong asymmetric gross substitutability, where the 
potential Giffen good is a gross substitute for the other good, and the other good is a gross 
complement to the Giffen good. We now develop a number of alternative decompositions of 
an own price change, that further highlight the role of asymmetric gross substitutability in 
determining the potential for Giffen behaviour. The analysis is mainly graphical, and serves to 




5.1. Fixed expenditure effect, and complementarity of the second good  
 
We know that in order for good 1 to be a potential Giffen good, it must be the case that 
good 2 is a gross complement to good 1. Can we somehow decompose the own-price effect 
on good 1 in an effect that reflects the degree to which good 2 is a gross complement to or 
gross substitute for good 1, and another effect? This can simply be done in the following way. 
First, consider what happens if good 2 is neither a gross substitute for nor a gross complement 
to good 1, meaning that the consumption of good 2 does not change after a decrease in the 
price of good 1. In the two-good case, in terms of the consumption of good 1, this simply 
means that the expenditure on good 1 remains fixed. This is why we call this the fixed 
expenditure effect. Graphically, in Figure 9, the fixed expenditure effect of a decrease in the 
price of good 1 is simply obtained by finding the bundle on the new budget line with the same 
level of consumption of good 2. This effect is unambiguous: a consumer who keeps his 
expenditure on good 1 fixed will consume more of good 1 when its price decreases. Second, 
consider the effect of good 2 being either a gross complement to or a gross substitute for good 
1. If good 2 is a gross complement to good 1, then the consumption of good 2 is increased 
compared to its fixed level in the fixed expenditure effect, meaning that the consumption of 
good 1 is necessarily decreased. Intuitively, if good 2 is a gross complement to good 1 (Figure 
9a), then the consumer will not only want to spend the budget increase caused by the price 
decrease of good 1 on good 1 itself, but will want some of good 2 along with this. This 
reduces the price effect on good 1. Put otherwise, the consumer is not satisfied with keeping 
his expenditure on good 1 fixed, but instead chooses to spend less on good 1 after the price 
decrease. We call this the deviation effect. If good 2 is instead a gross substitute for good 1, 
then the consumption of good 2 is decreased compared to its fixed level in the fixed 
expenditure effect, meaning that the consumption of good 1 is necessarily further increased. 
In this case, the deviation effect says that the consumer decides that rather than keeping his 
expenditure on good 1 fixed after the price decrease, he will instead spend more on good 1. 
As good 2 is a gross substitute for good 1, it can in part serve the same function as good 1; but 
when good 1 becomes cheaper, the consumer will let this function be served mainly by good 
1. It is clear from this that when good 2 is a gross substitute for good 1, the price elasticity of 
demand is relatively large, whereas it is relatively small when good 2 is a gross complement 
to good 1. 
 












Figure 9 : Alternative decomposition : fixed expenditure effect, and deviation effect 
 
This alternative decomposition is more than a theoretical construct, and makes sense as a 
decision rule for a boundedly rational consumer who uses simple rules of thumb to come to 
his demand decisions. Such a simple rule of thumb is to always keep one’s expenditure on 
good 1 fixed, no matter what the price of the good – which at the same time means that the 
consumption of all goods other than good 1 remains fixed. The specified alternative 
decomposition may have a psychological counterpart, in which the consumer as a first step 
follows such a decision rule (fixed expenditure effect), and then in second step considers how 
much the newly obtained consumption bundle is desirable, and possibly decides to deviate 
from the choice suggested by the fixed expenditure effect, and e.g. to give up some 
consumption of good 2 in favour of additional consumption of good 1.  
Formally, this decomposition is given in elasticity form by equation (6), namely 
1 2 1 1 ) / ( 1 1 2 p x p x s s ε ε − − = . The fixed expenditure effect simply says that the own-price elasticity 
is  –1, the deviation effect shows the deviation from this. Using equation (7), a similar 
decomposition can be used to show the effect of good 1 being a gross substitute for good 2 on 
the price elasticity of good 2. 
 
 
5.2. Inflation (deflation) effect, and substitutability of the first good 
 
The previous section explains the effect of good 2 being a gross complement to or gross 
substitute for good 1. Let us now look at the effect of good 1 being a gross complement to or a 
gross substitute for good 2. An alternative decomposition in which such an effect is isolated, 
is obtained in the following way. Consider a decrease in the price of good 1. In a first effect, 
the  deflation effect, the consumer acts as if all prices would have deflated by the same 
proportion as the price of good 1. Thus, the deflation effect is nothing but another version of 
the income effect. The second effect is the cross-price effect. Having considered the deflation 
effect, the consumer notices in fact that it is only the price of good 1 that has decreased. 
Therefore, in order to get to the final situation, the consumer needs to consider his choice after 
an increase in the price of good 2. If, as in Figure 10a, good 1 is a gross complement to good 
2, the price increase of good 2 will decrease the consumption of good 1, so that the price 
elasticity of good 1 is reduced. If, as in Figure 10b, good 2 is a gross substitute for good 1, the 
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price increase of good 2 will increase the consumption of good 1, so that the price elasticity of 






















Figure 10 Alternative decomposition: deflation effect and cross-price effect 
 
 
For a formalisation of this decomposition, given the assumption that consumers are not 
subject to money illusion, the demand for good 1 should be homogeneous of degree zero. By 
















i  (9) 
 
In elasticity form, this becomes:   0 = + ∑ m x
k
p x i k i ε ε , or 




=− − ∑ . It follows that, 
for two goods: 
 
2 1 1 1 1 p x m x p x ε ε ε − − = . (10) 
 
This simply says that an increase in the price of good 1 is equivalent to the price of good 1 
staying fixed, and income and the price of good 2 decreasing by the same percentage. We 
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inferior good. When good 1 is an inferior good, it is a gross substitute for good 2: both the 
substitution effect and the income effect go in the same direction (see equation (4)). Equation 
(10) shows that good 1 should not be too strong a gross substitute for good 2, because 
otherwise own-price elasticity is still negative. Thus, in the smaller car – larger car example, 
in order for the smaller car to be a Giffen good, the smaller car should be a gross substitute for 
the large car, but not too strong a gross substitute. 
The decomposition in equation (10) may again have a psychological counterpart. As a first 
step, the consumer chooses his consumption of good 1 as if the x% increase in the price of 
good 1 were equivalent to an overall loss in purchasing power of x%. As a second step, the 
consumer considers the fact that in reality, relative to such an overall loss in purchasing 
power, good 2 has become cheaper, and adapts his consumption of good 1 accordingly. 
 
 
5.3. Strong symmetric substitutability, and deviation 
 
The decompositions in Sections 5.1. and 5.2 separately consider the fact that for Giffen 
behaviour, good 1 must be a gross substitute for good 2 and that good 2 must be a gross 
complement to good 1. We now provide a decomposition which considers these two facts 
simultaneously, by looking for the demand bundle obtained when the two goods are strongly 
symmetrically substitutable, and by considering how the consumer deviates from this. 
Graphically, Figure 11 provides the standard Hicksian decomposition of total effect of a 
decrease in price of good 1 (from bundle I to bundle II) into a substitution effect (bundle I to 
bundle III) and an income effect (bundle III to bundle II). The income effect is here 
decomposed into two further effects. First, a new bundle IV is introduced which the consumer 
consumes if he considers the two goods as symmetric gross substitutes – meaning by 
Proposition 3 that the consumer has homothetic preferences. The bundle IV can simply be 
found by drawing a linear income expansion path that crosses both the origin and bundle III. 
We call the move from bundle III to bundle IV the symmetric gross substitutability effect. By 
the analysis in Section 4, bundle IV can be considered as the bundle that the consumer 
consumes if his preferences over low- and high-quality goods do not change as his purchasing 
power changes. Second, the change in consumption from bundle IV to bundle I reflects the 
effect of asymmetric gross substitutability, in this case the effect of good 1 being a better 
gross substitute for good 2 than good 2 is for good 1. By the analysis in Section 4, this effect 
at the same time may be considered as measuring the extent to which the consumer’s 
preferences over quality change as purchasing power is increased, where in the case of Figure 
11, if good 1 is considered as the high-quality good, the preferences for high quality decrease. 
As shown in (11), a formal representation of this decomposition follows straightforwardly 
from the Hicksian decomposition in elasticity form, which can be derived from equation (1), 
where 
11 hp ε is compensated own price elasticity, and s1 is the share of the budget spent on good 
1. In elasticity terms, the symmetric gross substitutability effect equals  1*1 s − , and the 
asymmetric gross substitutability effect equals  
1 1(1 ) xm s ε − : 
 
11 11 1 1 1( 1 ) xp hp xm s εε ε   =−− −    (11)   24
 
 




6. Conclusion and summary 
 
Whether or not Giffen behaviour is actually observed empirically, insight into the 
determinants of Giffen behaviour is useful to gain insight into the behaviour of rational 
consumers. This paper has shown that, on top of the traditional condition of inferiority of the 
Giffen good, the Giffen good should additionally be asymmetrically substitutable for the other 
good, in that the Giffen good is a gross substitute for the other good, but the other good is a 
gross complement to the Giffen good. While these two conditions are necessary conditions, it 
was shown that, when the necessary condition of inferiority is met, where one good is an 
inferior good an the other good a luxury, it may be that the inferior good is price elastic and 
the luxury is price inelastic. This is the opposite of what we need for approaching Giffen 
behaviour on the inferior good. As we argue, intuitively this may occur when the inferior 
good is a low-quality good and the luxury is a high-quality good. The demand for the low-
quality good is then price elastic, because a good substitute is available for it in the form of 
the luxury.  
With asymmetric substitutability, however, it is certain that good 1 is price inelastic and 
good 2 price elastic, and we do have a situation that always resembles Giffen behaviour. In 
this sense, the necessary condition that one good is a substitute for the other good, whereas 
the other good is a complement to the first good, better characterises Giffen or near-Giffen 
behaviour. Intuitively, rather than being a low-quality good, it can be argued that the Giffen 
good is a high-quality good, in the sense of being effective in letting the consumer subsist. At 
the same time, the luxury is a low-quality good, in that it in isolation it is ineffective in letting 
the consumer subsist. Put otherwise, the inferior good is a better substitute for the luxury than 
the other way around. This effect already makes the inferior good have a low price elasticity 
compared to the luxury. Further, when the consumer’s purchasing power increases, he is less 
concerned with subsistence, and if we equate subsistence with quality thus cares less about 
quality. This further decreases the size of the price elasticity of the inferior good, which for 
this reason may become a Giffen good. 
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